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CAUSAL AND EPISTEMIC RELEVANCE INAPPEALS TO AUTHORITYSebastiano Lommi
ABSTRACT. Appeals to authority have a long tradition in the history ofargumentation theory. During the Middle Age they were consideredlegitimate and sound arguments, but after Locke’s treatment in the Es-say Concerning Human Understanding their legitimacy has come un-der question. Traditionally, arguments from authority were consideredinformal arguments, but since the important work of Charles Hamblin(Hamblin, 1970) many attempts to provide a form for them have beendone. The most convincing of them is the presumptive form developedby Douglas Walton and John Woods (Woods and Watson, 1974) that aimsat taking into account the relevant contextual aspects in assessing theprovisional validity of an appeal to authority. The soundness of an ap-peal depends on its meeting the adequacy conditions set to scrutinizeall the relevant questions. I want to claim that this approach is compat-ible with the analysis of arguments in terms of relevance advanced byDavid Hitchcock (Hitchcock, 1992). He claims that relevance is a triadicrelation between two items and a context. The first item is relevant tothe second one in a given context. Different types of relevance relationexist, namely causal relevance and epistemic relevance. “Something is[causally] relevant to an outcome in a given situation if it helps to causethat outcome in the situation” (Hitchcock, 1992, p. 253) whereas it isepistemically relevant when it helps to achieve an epistemic goal in agiven situation. I claim that we can adapt this conception to Walton andKrabbe’s theory of dialogue type (Walton and Krabbe, 1995) seeing theitems of a relevance relation as the argument and its consequence andthe context as the type of dialogue in which these arguments are ad-vanced. According to this perspective, an argument from authority thatmeets the adequacy conditions has to be considered legitimate becauseit is an epistemically relevant relation. Therefore, my conclusion is that
COPYRIGHT. CC© BY:© $\© C© 2015 Sebastiano Lommi. Published in Italy. Some rightsreserved. AUTHOR. Sebastiano Lommi, s.lommi@student.rug.nl.RECEIVED. February, 7th 2015. ACCEPTED. March, 3rd 2015.
RIVISTAITALIANADIFILOSOFIAANALITICAJUNIOR6:1(2015)
29
Sebastiano Lommi Causal and Epistemic Relevance in Appeals to Authority
an analysis of appeals to authority in terms of relevance can be a usefultool to establish fallaciousness or legitimacy of such a kind of argumenteven within the established paradigm of argumentation theory.
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RIVISTAITALIANADIFILOSOFIAANALITICAJUNIOR6:1(2015)
30
Sebastiano Lommi Causal and Epistemic Relevance in Appeals to Authority
1 Introduction
The legitimacy of appeals to authority has traditionally been disputed all along thehistory of philosophy. As Douglas Walton claims (Walton, 1997, p. 33), in the ancientworld and in the Middle Ages it was considered a sound and legitimate argument.A turning point in the debate was the treatment advanced by John Locke, the firstwho used the label of argumentum ad verecundiam. In his 1690 Essay ConcerningHuman Understanding, Locke characterizes it in a quite different way in respect tohow it is conceived today. In Locke’s view, the argumentum ad verecundiam consistsin an appeal to the reverential awe (verecundia in Latin) of the opponent no lessthan to the expertise of an authority. The authority is such that every criticismadvanced by the opponent should be regarded as an act of pride or shamelessness.In Locke’s view, such a kind of move is not always fallacious, but surely it is whenused to silence the opponent by intimidating him or making him appear pride orpresumptuous. Locke’s treatment is one of the most relevant in the history of thisargument and it dictated the guidelines for every following treatment (Walton, 1997,p. 33).As it happens also for other kinds of arguments, even the appeal to authority isdouble-sided. We can obviously say that when such an appeal is used to silencethe opponent and to intimidate him to make him abandon his thesis, it has to beconsidered fallacious. However, appealing to authority becomes necessary when weare considering arguments that require high degrees of expertise. If two politiciansare discussing the opportunity of legalizing a drug in a TV talk, they have to appealto the opinions of expert pharmacologists or physicians to decide if this substance isdangerous or not. Also in our everyday life, the opinion of experts is very relevant:every time we ask our doctor what is the best way to treat our cold or when webring our car to the mechanic to have the engine repaired, we are relying on theirexpertise. Therefore, when an appeal to an expert’s opinion is used as a move insidea critical dialogue there are many factors that have to be considered in order toevaluate its legitimacy.In this paper, I would like to propose a particular view on this subject based onthe notion of relevance proposed by David Hitchcock (1992) and see if it can givea contribution in establishing the legitimacy of an appeal. My aim is to show thatan approach based on relevance can gain a different perspective on the subject, aperspective useful in evaluating the correctness of adopting appeals to authority asmoves in a dialogue.In the next sections of this paper I am going to examine various attempts toformalize the argumentum ad verecundiam by different authors. I will also focuson the conditions required to an authority to be considered such and to make anappeal to it appropriated. The second part of this paper will be dedicated to theissue of relevance.
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By the word “relevance”, I mean a triadic relation between two items and a con-text (Hitchcock, 1992, p. 252). We have to distinguish between causal and epistemicrelevance. According to Hitchcock, “something is [causally] relevant to an outcomein a given situation if it helps to cause that outcome in the situation” (Hitchcock,1992, p. 253), while it can be considered epistemically relevant when it helps inachieving an epistemic goal. In the context of a critical dialogue, we can consideran argument the relevant item, in our case an appeal to authority, while the itemto which it is relevant can be defined in two different ways. First, I propose toconsider causal relevance as the persuasion of the opponent achieved by whom putforward the argument. Therefore, the outcome is the persuasion. Second, in thecase of epistemic relevance, the second item of the triadic relation is an epistemicgoal. In the second part of the paper I will apply this concepts to the analysis of arecent debate about the appeal to authority trying to see if the notion of relevancemay be of some help in it.
2 Forms of the Argument
As I have stated in the introduction, different attempts have been made to formalizearguments from authority. For a long time, in the history of argumentation theory,the appeal to authority was considered an informal argument that did not fit anykind of formalization because of the many contextual factors involved.However, since the important work of Charles Hamblin Fallacies, several at-tempts have been made. Firstly, I want to consider the deductive formalizationproposed by Hamblin himself (Hamblin, 1970, p. 170):
Everything X says is true.
X says that p.
Therefore, p.
The form of the argument is deductively valid thanks to the universal quantifierin the first premise. However, this form places too strong constraints to the sound-ness of the appeal because it requires the existence of an omniscient authority. Thisformalization does not allow to shape appeals to authority in a plausible and real-istic way. For this reason, Hamblin dismisses the hypothesis of finding a deductiveform suitable for appeals to authority.However, some other attempts to find a deductive form for appeals to authorityhave been done, in particular placing restrictions on the domain in which expert’sbeliefs are assumed to be true. An instance of that can be found in Walton (1997,p. 93):
Everything E asserts on subject S is (or may be assumed to be) true.
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E asserts that A is true.
Therefore, A is true.
This form allows to restrict the domain of expertise, giving a more plausibleaccount of what should be taken as an expert. As Walton exemplifies (Walton, 1997,p. 93) when we look at a train schedule in a station, we assume information on itare true, though we cannot be sure that reality is not different and that the trainsupposed to leave at 12 is late. This deductive form is more plausible than the firstone but it is still too unrealistic to be an effective description of appeals to authority.Leaving aside the deductive form, we can turn to the inductive one, as suggestedby Wesley Salmon (1963, p. 63). The inductive form is meant to solve problems arisingfrom the deductive one by reducing the number of true beliefs an authority shouldhold in order to have a valid appeal.
The vast majority of statements made by E (A/N: expert source) concerningsubject S are true.
A is a statement made by E concerning subject S.
Therefore, A is true.
This form rests on the reliability of the expert instead of his infallibility becausethe first premise does not state that every assessment made by E in a domain istrue but only that the majority of them is. This gives us a more a realistic accountof the appeal to authority. It is an inductive form because the truth of the premisesdoes not grant the truth of the conclusion but only that is likely to be true. It is alsoa statistical form because the truth of the first premises is based on the strengthand the amount of the evidence we can bring in favour of the expert’s reliability.However this statistical aspect poses a problem: what to do when we are notable to judge the tracks record of an expert’s assessment? It might not be availablefor many reasons: for instance, we are watching a TV programme in which a physi-cian is claiming to have found a new treatment for cancer but we do not know himand so we are unable to decide if he is trustworthy or not. Another aspect, whichI have no room to treat extensively but it is crucial in appeals to authority, is: howto establish if someone is an expert if we ourselves are not expert in the domainin question? The tracks record may be present, but it may be too difficult for us tounderstand it. More generally evaluating experts’ reliability is a difficult task andbasing it only on the number of true assessments made by an expert might be notenough.To solve these problems, John Woods and Douglas Walton (Woods and Watson,1974, p. 150) suggest that a presumptive form would be more helpful to understandthe nature of appeal to authority argument.
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E is a genuine expert in S.
E asserts that A
A is within S.
A is consistent with what other experts say.
A is consistent with available objective evidence (if any is known). Therefore, Acan be accepted as a plausible presumption.
This form takes into account many contextual factors that play an important rolein evaluating a statement from authority. According to Woods and Walton, not onlythe expertise of the authority is relevant, but also the consensus among other expertsabout what the authority in question says. The fifth premise focuses on the evidenceabout the issue at stake available to whom is called to judge the correctness of theappeal. The presumptive form gives the possibility to add new premises that maybe relevant. According to this form, when new information is added to the premises,the conclusion may falter. For this reason, the conclusion is only presumptive.The form proposed by Wood and Walton has the merit of taking into accountmany aspects that play a role when we are called to judge an appeal to expertopinion. On the negative side, it has to be noticed that for the same reason itrequires much more knowledge in order to assess the soundness of an argument.Inductive and presumptive forms share a common feature that distinguish themfrom deductive ones. Deductive formalizations place the burden of proof on theproponent and when the opponent challenges the validity of the premises or therelation between them and the conclusion it is up to the proponent to show thestrength of the argument. In inductive and presumptive forms, instead, the conclusionprovisionally reached can be challenged by the opponent only if he shows that somerelevant factors have been neglected, for instance demonstrating that the world-known physic quoted was under the effect of drugs or alcohol when he expressedhis opinion.As we have seen, analysing appeals to authority disregarding contextual factorsdoes not succeed in providing an effective perspective on the question. To meetthis problem, authors like Walton, Anthony Blair and Ralph Johnson have triedto establish under which conditions an appeal to authority should be consideredlegitimate. These conditions will be the issue discussed in the next section.
3 Adequacy Conditions
Now let’s turn to consider the adequacy conditions mentioned in the previous sec-tion. Walton individuates six main critical questions that can be addressed to some-one who advances an appeal to authority. If these questions can be positively an-swered the appeal has to be considered provisionally legitimate. Now I briefly
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report them and then I will examine them.
1. Expertise question: How credible is E as an expert source?
2. Field question: Is E an expert in the field that A is in?
3. Opinion question: What did E assert that implies A?
4. Trustworthiness question: Is E personally reliable as a source?
5. Consistency question: Is A consistent with what other experts assert?
6. Backup evidence question: Is A’s assertion based on evidence? (Walton, 1997,p. 223)
A positive answer to the first question implies that the expert considered isa reliable source of knowledge. Some other subquestions can rise from the firstone, in particular those that aim to verify the expert’s professional or academicbackground. A typical negative answer to the first question is represented by thecase of a testimonial who advertises a product, for which he has no competence, invirtue of his prestige or his glamour. This is a classic case in which an appeal toauthority fails in meeting the adequacy conditions and in particular the conditionof the expertise of the authority.The second question aims to make clear if the expert quoted as authority issuch in the considered domain. An authority can be such in a domain that is notthe one considered in a particular appeal. This is an improper move in a criticaldialogue due to a mistake on the side of the proponent but it can also be doneon purpose to try to force the opponent to leave his point on the ground of theauthority prestige. If in a critical dialogue about the health risks brought by smoke,I quote a renowned novelist who dismisses the worries saying that smoking helpshis creative process and it is not dangerous for health, I am committing a fallacybecause the authority is not such in the field at stake. When considering the fieldof expertise, we should pay attention also to the particular subfields that makesup the major one. Scientific disciplines are often constituted by various fields ofspecialization and being an expert in one of them does not imply to be such also inthe others. Therefore, considering a theoretical physicist an expert of experimentalphysics could be a fallacy, even if, of course, he has more knowledge in experimentalphysics than a layman.The third question aims to verify the correctness of experts’ quotation. In orderto have a legitimate appeal to authority, the expert’s opinion has to be correctlyinterpreted and not distorted by the proponent. In particular, in the context of awritten text, the proponent should provide all the necessary references to expert’sopinion quoted to allow the opponents and the readers to track the first source ofsuch opinion. An even more critical point is establishing the right interpretationof an opinion from authority. Even when a quotation presents all the necessary
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references it might be the case that the proponent has manipulated it to supporthis own claim. This can be done in several ways, for instance by extracting itfrom its original context. Therefore, even an appropriate quotation can turn outto be misleading and pushing the authority opinion to support a claim that wasnot originally in the expert’s mind. Another point of concern is represented bythe deduction of experts’ opinions from what they have clearly asserted. Experts’opinions are not always explicit and sometimes need to be deducted. However,this process can be risky and might lead to a misunderstanding of such opinion.There is no clear strategy to avoid all these obstacles because they can hardly beformalized, still we need to pay attention to all these aspects to avoid illegitimateappeal or real fallacies.The trustworthiness question overlaps, to some extent, the first question. It isquite reasonable to relate the trustworthiness of an expert to his being actuallysuch. However, the notion of trustworthiness is broader and pertains not only theexpertise held by an authority but even different contextual aspects. We can takethe case of a renowned scientist who stands for the utility of a particular drug intreating a disease, but it turns out he has received financial benefits form the com-pany that produces the drug. This situation does not immediately disqualify thescientist from being considered an authority, however it should suggest the partic-ipants in the debate to consider carefully the scientist’s opinion and his potentialconflict of interests. This is a simple instance of a potential worry in the expert’strustworthiness, but many others are conceivable and this makes the attempt toprovide an accurate treatment of this point very hard.The fifth critical question attains the consistency of an expert’s opinion with theones held by other experts in the same field. The question of the consensus amongexperts is one of the major problem in evaluating appeals to authority as legitimateargument. Clearly, the appeal to the opinion of someone who is totally discreditedby the experts of his supposed domain of authority has to be rejected as a fallacy,however problems arise in more blurred situations. When the question at stake ishighly controversial it may be the case that different authorities, recognized as suchby the community of experts, disagree. How should we act in this situation? Woodand Walton (Woods and Watson, 1974, p. 145) uggest that in case of disagreementa “consensus technique” is required to settle the dispute between experts. A con-sensus technique is a method or a procedure used to monitor what is the generalacceptance of an opinion in a particular field. Walton argues that when such opinionis “representative of what is generally accepted in the field” (Walton, 1997, p. 221)the argument can be legitimate, for however, when it is non-representative, dismiss-ing this opinion requires a justification by the opponent. In other word, dismissingan expert’s opinion shifts the burden of proof from the proponent of the appeal tothe opponent.
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The last critical question concerns the evidence on which every appeal to au-thority should be grounded and, perhaps, is the most questionable. Due to itspresumptive and non-deductive nature, appeals to authority should be based onsome kind of evidence available in principle. However when we appeal to an expertis because we lack the evidence required. For a layman is hard to have access toscientific evidence and sometimes, even when this evidence is available, it is hard tocorrectly interpret it. Requiring the proponent of the appeal to have direct evidenceseems to be a too strict constraint for the validity of such appeal, however the expertin question should be able to prove his assertions showing the required evidenceand, in general, providing a justification for them.After this introduction to the general structure of the appeal to authority and itsfeatures, I will introduce the core question of the paper: the notion of relevance andits application to the argumentum ad verecundiam.
4 Relevance
In his 1992 paper “Relevance”, Hitchcock describes relevance as a triadic relationbetween an item, an outcome and a situation (Hitchcock, 1992, p. 252). Firstly, it isimportant to stress the fact that relevance is not a property. There can be no sucha thing relevant in itself. Every item assumes its relevance in relation to a contextand an outcome. This means that the same thing can be relevant or irrelevantdepending on the context in which is positioned. We have to consider it as animportant feature of relevance, in particular, following Walton and Krabbe’s theoryof dialogue types (Walton and Krabbe, 1995, p. 252), we can say that a shift in thekind of dialogue exerts an influence on the relevance of an argument. The sameargument may be considered relevant inside a critical dialogue and irrelevant ina deliberation-seeking dialogue. For instance, if I am discussing the quality of amovie with a friend, I can appeal to a renowned film critic to support my opinion.However, if we are trying to decide what is the best movie to watch and the onlycinema that screens that particular movie is too far, the appeal to the famous criticmay be overwhelmed by more practical considerations. This depends on the factthat every kind of dialogue has its own goal. Here we assume that the goals ofdifferent dialogues are the outcomes that constitute one of the elements of the triadicrelevance relation. For our purpose, we have to specify the correspondence betweenelements of a dialogue and elements of the relevance relation. The item that bearsthe relevance is the argument put forward in a particular stage of the discussion.To define better which the features of the outcome in a relevance relation are, weshould avoid to mislead the goal of a dialogue with the individual ones sought byparticipants, as Walton clearly states (Walton, 2008, p. 8). The object of a criticaldialogue is getting a stable resolution of an initial disagreement, however everyparticipant aims to persuade the opponent to leave his initial position to embrace
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the proponent’s one.Now I will introduce the two different kinds of relevance proposed by Hitchcockand then I will try to see them in the light of the distinction between dialoguegoal and individual ones. Hitchcock distinguishes between causal and epistemicrelevance. The first is present when an item (i.e. an argument) contributes toproduce a practical consequence. The notion of “practical consequence” is broadlyconceived, but we can shape it better referring to the contextual dimension that isconstituent of every relevance relation.If we turn to consider the dialogue goal of a critical discussion as the reachingof an agreement between the participants, we can say that an argument is causallyrelevant when it succeeds in establishing this agreement. This can be done indifferent ways. If the argument is sound, it may lead to the agreement becauseof its strength. The opponent may recognize the contribution of the argument andconcede the point.Such a kind of valid argument leads us to the second kind of relevance, theepistemic one. Broadly speaking, “an item of information x would be epistemicallyrelevant to an epistemic goal y pursued by a set S of person in a situation z”(Hitchcock, 1992, p. 256). Within the dialogue context, a legitimate (i.e., not fallacious)argument is such that it contributes to explore and deepen the issue at stake;in this sense we can consider it as epistemically relevant because it increasesour knowledge. Going further, we can say that an argument that is epistemicallyrelevant in a given context has to generate one or more true beliefs. These beliefsmay be the ones that settle the question or, in an intermediate stage, that helpsin going further with the dialogue. We should be aware of the fact that, unlikecausally relevant argument, epistemic relevance has to be noticed in order to be inplace. Whereas an argument that holds causal relevance necessarily brings practicalconsequence, an epistemically relevant argument needs to be recognize as such. Anepistemically relevant argument, if recognized, can also become causally relevantbecause it may lead to settle the dispute by mean of his strength (Hitchcock, 1992,p. 254). . Take the case of two people debating about airplanes chemtrails duringa TV talk. One of them is arguing against the existence of such trails appealing tothe opinion of an illustrious chemist, but the second, a committed conspiracy-theorysupporter, may not recognize the legitimacy of the appeal claiming that the chemistis himself part of the conspiracy even whereas no evidence of that is available.Therefore, even if the appeal is sound it does not lead to settle the dispute.I should make clear that the present distinction is correct only within a context,as the critical dialogue, in which the participants are supposed to hold a reflectivestance toward the arguments and accept them only on the basis of an adequatescrutinizing. However, this does not grant, as in our example, that the participantsdo not reject a sound argument.Now, I will turn to the individual goal (i.e., the participants’ goal) in a critical
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dialogue. Every participant aims to persuade the opponent to leave his own initialposition and accept the proposed one. If this is done by means of a sound argument(an argument that is at least epistemically relevant) no problem arises and theexchange has to be regarded as correct. However, the persuasion of the opponentcan be reached also by influencing him from a psychological point view with anargument that appears to be sound but actually is not. And that is a rather classicaldefinition of fallacy. Therefore, a fallacy is an argument that succeeds in persuadingthe opponent but for the wrong reasons. It is seductive but it does not contributeto increase our knowledge or understanding of the question at stake in the criticaldialogue. In other words, it is causally but not epistemically relevant.In this paper, I would like to argue that an appeal to authority that is epistem-ically relevant should be regarded as a valid move in a critical dialogue, whereasone that is causally relevant should look as a possible fallacy. To clarify this point,I will examine different combinations of these two types of relevance.An appeal to authority is epistemically relevant when it helps in achieving anepistemic goal. To do so, the appeal needs to meet the adequacy conditions seen inthe previous section. In my view, saying that an appeal to authority is epistemicallyrelevant amounts to saying that the appeal should be regarded as a sound argument.Once an appeal to authority is recognized as epistemically relevant, two differentthings may happen:
1. its relevance is noticed and therefore it becomes also causally relevant.
2. its relevance is not recognized and it does not become causally relevant.
In the first case, the practical consequence is the reaching of an agreement overthe controversial question. The opponent may leave his initial position and embracethe one suggested by the proponent. In the second case, the opponent does notrecognize the soundness of the appeal and the critical dialogue may move to adifferent stage. According to the pragma-dialectic perspective, the opponent mayask the proponent of the argument to defend his appeal to authority. This act takesplace at the argumentation stage and it is called directive speech act because itconsists in a licit command aiming at the clarification of an argument (van Eemerenand Grootendorst, 2004, p. 64). After the requested clarification, the opponent maystill not recognize the validity of argument and the dialogue could move toward afurther clarification.Here I am distinguishing between the objective validity of a move, and the sub-jective recognition of it. The first can be in place even when the second is not. Whenan appeal to authority has only causal relevance we meet a successful fallacy, anargument that is seductive and can push the opponent to leave his initial positioneven whereas it does not undermine that. That is the typical case of a fallacy, anappealing but not valid move in a dialogue. To detect an inappropriate appeal to
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authority, we have to be aware of the different adequacy conditions and check ifthe appeal meets them.
5 An Approach to Contemporary Debates
Now that I have provided an account of appeals to authority in the light of the notionsof causal and epistemic relevance, I would like to apply it to a recent debate arisenabout the strength (or the weakness) of this kind of argument. I will refer to twodifferent papers, one by Moti Mizrahi (2013) and the other by Marcus Seidel (2014).In a nutshell, Mizrahi argues for the weakness of appeal to authority claimingthat empirical findings on expertise show that a proposition expressed by an expertis not more likely to be true that one based on chance (Mizrahi, 2013, p. 58). Therefore,he concludes that appeals to authority are weak arguments. We can read Mizrahi’sclaim in the light of what I have previously said about relevance. An argument fromauthority, according to Mizrahi, lacks epistemic relevance because it does not helpin achieving any epistemic goal. In particular, he claims that the appeal to expertopinion has to be considered an unreliable method because the evidence shows itdoes not make a proposition more likely to be true. Many objections can be raisedagainst Mizrahi’s argument (and Seidel does so) but more generally we can saythat the question can be read in term of epistemic relevance. Mizrahi argues thatappeals to authority have none, while Seidel claims they have it.Mizrahi takes the case of two electrochemist who claimed that they had founda way to produce a nuclear fusion at room temperature. The argument can bereconstructed in this way:
1. Electrochemists Fleischmann and Pons say that nuclear fusion can occur atroom temperature.
2. Therefore, nuclear fusion can occur at room temperature (Mizrahi, 2013, p. 62)
In this case, a true premise leads to a false conclusion showing how appealsto authority (in this case the authority of the two electrochemists) may lack theepistemic relevance to achieve the goal of establishing which temperature is suitablefor nuclear fusion. Mizrahi adopts a similar approach to other examples, concludingthat appeals to authority do not provide strong support for the truth of a claim. As Ihave said before, epistemic relevance is related to the notion of truth: epistemicallyrelevant appeals to authority should be able to gain us true beliefs and, accordingto Mizrahi, they do not.If the question is that appeals to authority do not provide true beliefs, or at leastnot enough to be considered a reliable method, Seidel’s challenge is proving they areepistemically relevant in developing good argument. First, he claims that accordingto Goldman’s definition of authority “a person A is an authority in a subject S ifand only if A knows more propositions in subject S [...] than almost anybody else”
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(Seidel, 2014, p. 196). We can translate “A knows more proposition in subject S” with“A has more true beliefs related to subject S”. Therefore, Seidel claims that wouldbe analytically false to say that “expert opinions are only slightly more accuratethan chance”. Again, we can say that appeals to expert opinion are epistemicallyrelevant because they allow us to have access to a large number of true beliefs heldby authorities.However, Seidel admits that Goldman’s definition of authority is questionable(Seidel, 2014, p. 198) so he turns to another argument. This argument is particularlyinteresting for my purpose because it allows me to use both kinds of relevance inthe appeal to authority context. Seidel claims that there is a difference betweenbeing an expert and being taken as an expert. This distinction can be specified byexamining the adequacy conditions and, in particular, the first critical question. Anappeal to an actual authority differs from an appeal to an alleged authority. The firstone should be able to grant us a wide range of true beliefs (see above) whereasthe second might not. Rephrasing that, we can say that the first has epistemicrelevance and second does not. In the second case, we have an illegitimate appealto authority: someone who is not an expert in the domain at stake is taken to bean authority. This kind of appeal, which does not meet adequacy condition, canbe qualified as a proper fallacy. In fact, an appeal to an authority that is not suchin a specific domain can be causally relevant because it can push the opponent tochange his mind or leave his initial position by mean of the prestige of the authority.Seidel claims that Mizrahi should argue against the second case, which is fallacious,not against the first one.According to Seidel, the examples taken by Mizrahi are cases of misjudgementon authority: appeals are not to real authorities but only to taken as such ones. Wecan read the question in the light of relevance saying that Mizrahi is committed tocriticize appeals to the authority that are not into an epistemically relevant relationbut only into a casually relevant one, whereas a valid appeal to authority has tobe into the first one. In other words, Mizrahi is not challenging a correct accountof the appeal to authority, but a mere straw- man.
6 Conclusions
I wish to have shown how the notion of relevance can be fruitfully employed toassess the validity of an argument and, in particular, of an appeal to authority. Myaim was to prove that relevance can be adopted as a useful tool in argumentationtheory even inside the well-established paradigms of the discipline. In particular,I hope to have stressed enough the relationship between the adequacy conditionsand the epistemic relevance of an appeal. In other words, adequacy conditions canbe regarded as guidelines to assess the epistemic relevance of an argument andthus its correctness.
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